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• Charles E. Tweedy, Jr. Professor of Law, The University of Alabama; Coun·
sel, King & Spalding. I am proud to hold an endowed chair at The University of
Alabama named for one of the most accomplished and respected lawyers in the
state. I am grateful to the Tweedy family for their generous gifts to the Law SchooL
At the time I wrote this Article (October 1997), I was a partner with King &
Spalding. I am also proud of that. And, I am grateful to King & Spalding for the
many opportunities it affords me.
One of my opportunities as a King & Spalding lawyer was malting the oral
argument for the General Motors Acceptance Corporation to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti, a
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proud that I lost the case and, of course, I am not grateful to the Second Circuit. I
am a real bad loser.
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ExPLANATION OF "CRAM DOWN" OF
HOLDER OF SECURED CLAIM

In many cases filed under Chapter 131 of the Bankruptcy
Code,2 the debtor wants to keep her car or truck and modify the
1. It can be said that Chapt.er 13 began in Alabama in the 1920s; an Alabama
bankruptcy referee, Valentine Nesbit, developed an informal process for the resolu·
tion of bankruptcy cases through a negotiat.ed plan of periodic repayments by the
bankrupt, instead of the liquidation of the bankrupt's property. This became the precursor to Chapt.er XIII, which in turn was the precursor to Chapt.er 13. See NATION·
AL BANKRUPI'CY REvlEW COMMISSION FINAL REPoRT, BANKRUPl'CY: THE NEXT TwENTY
YEARS 233 (Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter NATIONAL BANKRUPI'CY REvIEw COMMISSION];
H.R. 12889, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., iv (Comm. Print 1936); Bankruptcy Act: Hearings
on H.R. 8046 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62
(1937); 81 CONG. REc. 8646-47 (1937); see generally W. HOMER DRAKE & JEFFREY
MORRIS, CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND PRocEDURE 1.04 (1983) (discussing the origins of
Chapt.er 13); Harry H. Haden, Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plans-Forgotten Man Bank·
ruptcy, 55 KY. L.J. 564 (1966) (~sing the history and use of Chapt.er XIII).
Nesbit's successor, Clarence Allgood, played a significant role in the implementation
of Chapt.er XIII. See STEPHEN B. COLEMAN, JR. & JUDGE STEPHEN B. COLEMAN, SR.,
JUDGE CLARENCE ALI.Goon 19·23, 27-28 (1991); Clarence W. Allgood, Operation of
the Wage Earners' Plan in the Northern District of Alabama, 14 RUTGERS L. REv.
578 (1960) (examining briefly the operation of Chapt.er XIII of the Bankruptcy Act).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1995). All Chapt.ers and sections referred to herein
are Chapt.ers and sections of the Bankruptcy Code.
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terms of her car note in a manner that is not acceptable to the
lender. And, in many Chapter 11 business cases, the debtor
wants to keep its equipment or building and modify the terms of
its secured loan in a manner that is not acceptable to the lender.
A bankruptcy court can confirm a Chapter 11, 12, or 13 plan
that modifies the rights of a secured creditor without the consent of that creditor. In other words, the plan can be "crammed
down" over the objection of the secured creditor.8
Neither Chapter 11, Chapter 12, or Chapter 13 uses the
words "cram down."' Nonetheless, cram down has been described by Judge Robert J. Kressel, a bankruptcy judge in Minnesota, as the "centerpiece of the reorganization chapters."5 As
Judge Kressel explains, the cram down of a secured creditor6 in

3. While Alabama can claim credit for Chapter 13, it escapes the blame for the
cram down. In Nesbit's wage earner proceedings in Birmingham, repayment plans
were consensual-acceptable to both the bankrupt and to creditors. Similarly, Chapter XIII under the prior Bankruptcy Act, did not provide for a cram down. The
assent of each secured creditor whose debt was •dealt with by the plan• was required. See Bankruptcy Act Section 652(1) (1995) (original version at 11 U.S.C.
1052(1)).
4. Nor do these sections use the term •cramdown: although reported cases use
both •cram down• and •cramdown." Compare Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash,
117 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1997) (using the words •cram down") with In re Rash, 90
F.3d 1036, 1052 (5th Cir. 1996) (using the term •cramdown"). In 1997, the Ninth
Circuit used both "cramdown• and "cram down.• (This is not the reason that Congress is considering a split of the Ninth Circuit into two judicial circuits.) Compare
In re Ambanc La Mesa Ltd. Partnership, 115 F.3d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1997) (using
the term •cramdown"), wUh In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1997)
(using the term •cram down"). Both "cram down• and •cramdown• can be found in
the opinions of Alabama bankruptcy judges. Compare In re Equitable Dev. Corp.,
196 B.R. 889, 892 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1996) (using the term "cramdown"), with In re
Hardy Machinery, 1994 WL 722084, at *l (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1994) (using the term
•cram down"). Chandler Watson, who served as bankruptcy judge in Anniston, Alabama for twenty-nine years, used the phrase "smooth down• instead of cram down.
See 2 KEITH LUNDIN, CHAPl'ER 13 BANKRUPl'CY § 5.42 n.519 (2d ed. 1994).
5. In re Mattson, 210 B.R. 157, 159 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997); see gelll!rally Kenneth Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Urukr the New
Banleruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979) (describing the requirements for
cramdown under the Bankruptcy Code).
6. Just as reported cases, but not the Bankruptcy Code, use the term •cram
down,• reported cases, but not the Bankruptcy Code, use the term "secured creditor.•
E.g., Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1880 (1997); In re
Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 317 (7th Cir. 1996). Section 506 "abolishes the use of the
terms 'secured creditor' and 'unsecured creditor' and substitutes in their places the
terms [holder of] 'secured claim' and [holder of] 'unsecured claim."' S. REP. No. 95989 at 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854; H.R. REP. No. 75-595,
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a Chapter 11, 12, or 13 case
starts with § 506(a) which basically provides that a creditor holding a security interest in property has a secured claim only to the
extent that there is value in that property to provide actual security for its claim.... The basic rule of cram.down is that, under a
plan, a debtor must make payments to a secured creditor which
have a value equal to the debtor's allowed secured claim, which is
not necessarily its entire claim.7

As Judge Kressel's description indicates, there are two separate valuations involved in the cram down of a secured claim.8
First, the court must determine the value of the creditor's collateral. Second, the court must determine the value of the deferred
payments proposed by the plan to determine whether the present value of such payments at least equals the value of the collateral.
Assume, for example, thatD, a Chapter 13 debtor, still owes
$10,000 on her GMAC car loan. To approve a Chapter 13 plan,
over GMAC's objection, that provided for D's retaining the car
and making periodic payments to GMAC, a bankruptcy court
would first have to determine the value of the car. If the court
valued the car at $7,000, GMAC would have a $7,000 secured
claim, even though the amount owing on the car loan was more
than $7,000. D's plan could satisfy GMAC's secured claim by
paying GMAC $7,000 in cash on the date of plan confirmation.
Most Chapter 13 plans (and Chapter 11 plans), however, provide
for paying secured claims in installments. If D's plan provides
for such installment payments, the court would then have to
address the second valuation involved in a cram down of a secured claim and determine whether the present value of the
proposed payments under D's plan was at least $7,000.
Recently, the Supreme Court in Associates Commercial
Corp. v. Rash,9 considered the first question of how to value a
creditor's security interest in property. 10 Interpreting section
at 356 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.AN. 5963, 6312.
7. Mattson, 210 B.R. at 159.
8. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPI'CY 866 (1997); see generally Chaim Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L.
REv. 1061 (1985) (discussing principles of valuation in bankruptcy).
9. 117 s. Ct. 1879 (1997).
10. &uh, 117 S. Ct. at 1885; see generally Jon Yard Amason, Although TM Su-
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506(a),11 Rash held that in a cram down, valuation of retained
encumbered property must be based on a "replacement-value
standard."12
This Article considers the second and different question of
how to value the proposed payments under the plan. While the
question of how to value the proposed payments under the plan
is different from the question of how to value the creditor's security interest in property, there is a connection between the answers to the questions. The value of the payments must at least
equal the value of the security interest.
II. BANKRUPI'CY CODE PROVISIONS ON CRAM DOWN
OF SECURED

CLAIMS

The cram down of a secured claim involves not only section
506, but also section 1129(bX1), section 1222(b)(2), or section
1322(bX2), which permit a Chapter 11, 12, or 13 plan to "impair"
or "modify" the rights of holders of secured claims. Any plan
impairment or modification must be confirmed by the bankruptcy judge. In approving such a change over the objection of the
affected secured creditor, the court must find that the requirements of sections 1129(b)(2)(A), 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii), or
1325(aX5XBXii), generally referred to as the cram down provisions, have been satisfied.
preme Court Tried to Clarify How to Value Secured Claima When Bankruptcy "Cram
Down• ProvisioM Are Invoked, The Standards Remain Unclear, NAT'L L.J., July 14,
1997, at BS (discussing the impact of the Rash case and highlighting unanswered
questions that must still be addressed by the lower courts); Alan Ostrowitz, Valuation of Personal Property in Chapter 13 CramdowM, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 12, 1997, at 1
(noting that the Rash decision was a clear victory for secured lenders).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this
title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest
in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent
that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is
less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined
in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use
of such property, and in coajunction with any hearing on such disposition or
use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1995).
12. &uh, 117 S. Ct. at 1882.
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Section 1129(b)(2XA) provides in pertinent part:
With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing
such claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the
allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the
estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any
property that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and
clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of
such sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds under
clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable
equivalent of such claims.18

Sections 1225(aX5) and 1325(aX5) provide:
with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan •..
CBXii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to
be distributed [by the trustee or the debtor] (only in § 1225(aX5))
under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to
such holder (emphasis added). 14

Obviously, the language of the provision for cram down of
secured creditors in Chapter 11 cases differs from the provisions
for cram down in Chapters 12 and 13 cases. Section 1129(a)
refers to "deferred cash payments," while sections 1225(aX5) and
1325(aX5) refer to "property to be distributed ... under the
plan," which, at least in theory, could be "property" other than
"cash payments." And, in Chapter 11 the alternative to such
deferred cash payments is "realization . . . of the indubitable
equivalent,"15 while in Chapters 12 and 13 the alternative to
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(bX2XA) (1995) (emphasis added).
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(aX5) and 1325(aX5) (1995) (emphasis added).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1995); see also In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941,
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the plan property distributions is the debtor's surrender of the
encumbered property.16
And there are other differences among the Chapters that
affect the operation of these provisions.17 For example, Chapters
12 and 13 require that all of the debtor's projected disposable
income be used to make payments under the plan.18 Accordingly,
in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases, contests over the cram
down interest rate for secured creditors affect the relative distributions among creditors, but do not affect what the debtor retains. In Chapter 11 cases, on the other hand, contests over the
cram down interest rate for secured creditors may affect not only
relative distributions among creditors but also the relative allocation between debt and equity.
Notwithstanding these differences, the courts and commentators have generally treated the question of how the cram down
interest rate should be determined as a question that is answered the same in Chapter 11, 12, and 13 cases.19 Note the
italicized phrase, "value, as of the effective date of the plan," in
each of these sections.20 Each of these provisions requires that a

942 (2d Cir. 1935) (stating "he [a secured creditor] wishes to get his money or at
least the property. We see no reason to ••• deprive him of that ••• unless by a
substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.").
16. •structurally, it appears that these two alternatives are set forth as equivalent methods of protecting the creditor's security interest where it does not accept
the debtor's treatment of that interest under the plan. Accordingly, one would expect
that these alternatives would yield the same result.• Associates Commercial Corp. v.
Rash, 90 F.3d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1996), rer/d, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
17. See generally David Epstein & Christopher Fuller, Chapters 11 and 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code: Observationa on Using Case Aidlwrity From One of the Chapters in
Proceedings Under the Other, 38 VAND. L. REY. 901 (1985) (focusing on the relationship between Chapter 11 and Chapter 13).
18. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225CbXl)(B) and 1325(bXl)(B) (1994).
19. E.g., Koopmans v. Farm Credit Services of Mid-America, ACA, 102 F.3d 874
(7th Cir. 1996) (Chapter 12 case which cited to Chapter 13 cases and uses the "indubitable equivalent" language of Chapter 11); In re River Village Associates, 161
B.R. 127, 135 (Ban1a. E.D. Pa. 1993 ) ("cases analyzing the appropriate interest rate
in a present value analysis under any of these sections are instructive•); Dean
Pawlowic, Entitlement to Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEV. J.
149, 173-78 (1995); Hon. John Pearson et al., Ending the Judicial Snipe Hunt: The
Search for the Cramdown Interest Rate, 4 ABI L. REY. 35 (1996); but aee In re 222
Liberty Associates, 108 B.R. 971, 995 n.16 (Ban1a. E.D. Pa. 1990) (suggesting a
more •consumer oriented• approach in Chapter 13 cases).
20. This phrase also appears in section 1129(aX9XC) (Chapter 11 priority tax
claims). See aupra text accompanying notes 13 & 14.
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secured creditor who is not either paid in full or permitted to
repossess must receive the present equivalent value of its secured claim.21 If the Chapter 11, 12 or 13 plan proposes periodic
payments, the court must determine the "value, as of the effective date of the plan," of the plan's promised stream of payments.
For example, if a creditor has a secured claim of $36,000, a
Chapter 13 plan provision for 36 monthly payments of $1,000
will not have a "value, as of the effective date of the plan" of
$36,000. Obviously, a creditor would rather have $36,000 in cash
than a Chapter 13 debtor's promise to pay $36,000 over thirtysix months-obviously, such a promise does not have a present
value of $36,000. What is not obvious is how large the promised
stream of payments has to be in order to have a present value of
$36,000-what is not obvious is the interest rate that will fully
compensate the secured creditor for the delay in receiving payment in full of the secured claim immediately on confirmation of
the plan.22
Notice that the words "interest rate," like the words "cram
down," do not appear in sections 1129(bX2XA), 1125(aX5XBXii),
or 1325(aX5XBXii).23 The words do, however, regularly appear in
21. Associat.es Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1888 (1997) ("payments over the life of the plan, that will total the present value of the allowed
secured claim • • • ").
22. Cf. Walter J. Blum, Treatment of Interest on Debtor Obligationa in Reorganizations Urukr the Bankruptcy Code, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 430, 439 (1983) ('To determine its present value, a sum due in the future must, of course, be discounted to
reflect the interest foregone by the creditor during the period the debtor has use of
the funds."); LUNDIN, supra note 4, at 5-139, 5-140 ("The phrase 'value, aa of the
effective date of the plan' means that a stream of future payments must be discounted to present value. • • • The payment of interest is just a mathematical technique for ensuring that secured claim holder gets the present value of its claim
while it waits for payments under the plan.").
23. The words "interest at the current fair market rate• do appear in section
362(dX3). It has been argued that since Congress used that phrase in section
362(dX3), but not in section 1129(bX2XA), section 1225(aX5XBXii), or section
1325(aX5XBXii), that Congress intended for "value, aa of the effective date of the
plan• to be different from the current fair market rate. See Robert Quila, Cramdown
Interest Rate: Second Circuit Court of Appeals Addresses What It Is and What It Is
Not, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 549, 555 (1997). "Expressio unius, exclusio alteriua• is
a recognized statutory construction argument. See, e.g., Burgo v. General Dynamics
Corp., 122 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1997); Ex parte Dunlop Tire Corp., Nos. 1951184,
1960105, 1997 WL 531095 (Ala. Aug. 29, 1997). In this instance, however, the argument is weakened by the fact that section 362(dX3) was added to the Bankruptcy
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the judicial opinions that apply these sections to cram down
secured creditors.
ill. UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
DECISIONS ON CRAM DOWN INTEREST PRIOR TO RAsH

One bankruptcy judge describes his colleagues' opinions
setting the cram down interest rate as a '"many-colored splendor
of conflicting and sometimes indecipherable formulas. ,,,u And,
there are reported bankruptcy court opinions to support almost
any conceivable cram down interest rate.25
There is much less diversity in the opinions from the ten
courts of appeals that have issued opinions on cram down interest rates. None of the circuit court decisions has taken the position that "value, as of the effective date of the plan" should have
a different meaning in Chapter 11 cases from its meaning in
Chapter 12 and 13 cases.28 And all of the circuit court decisions
agree that the cram down interest rate should be a "market"
rate. The disagreement is limited to the approach and
methodology for determining what the market rate is.
Seven of the circuits-the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits-have approved the calculation of cram down interest by looking to the rate that the debtor
would pay outside of bankruptcy to obtain a loan on terms comparable to the terms proposed in the plan. This approach has
been labeled the "coerced loan" approach.
Three of the circuits-the Second, Eighth and Tenth-have
Code in 1994 as a result of special interest lobbying efforts. See generally Dan
Willenburg & Baxter Dunaway, Single Anet Real Estate CCl8e8 after the Banleruptcy
&form Act of 1994, 5 BANKR. DEV. J. 107 (1996) (reviewing treatment of single
asset real estate cases under the 1994 amendments).
24. In re Computer Optics, Inc., 126 B.R. 664, 671 (Ban1tr. N.H. 1991).
25. Compare, e.g., In re Hardware, 189 B.R. 273 (Ban1tr. E.D.N.Y. 1989) (New
York judgment rate of 9%); and In re Reinhardt, 187 B.R. 433 (Ban1tr. N.D.N.Y.
1995) (contract rate of 17.99%); and In re Miller, 13 B.R. 110 (Banltr. S.D. Ind.
1981) (average of contract rate and market rate); and In re Klein, 10 B.R. 657
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (average of legal rate and contract rate); and In re Hyden,
10 B.R. 21 (Banltr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (average of 6% and the Ohio installments sales
rate and the contract rate).
26. But cf. Matter of Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that
expert testimony on valuation presented in certain Chapter 11 cases is not practice
for the regular Chapter 13 case).
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approved the calculation of cram down interest by looking to the
sum of a base "risk-free" rate, such as the rate for treasury securities, for a duration comparable to the payout period under the
plan plus an adjustment for risk. This approach has been labeled the "formula approach."

A Origins of the Coerced Loan Approach
1. Collier.-The "coerced loan" approach is generally attributed to the Collier bankruptcy treatise.27 As early as 1980, Collier28 advocated a coerced loan approach to determining the secured creditor cram down interest rate in its discussion of section 1129(b)(2XA):

It is submitted that deferred payment of an obligation under a
plan is like a coerced loan and the rate of return with respect to
such loan must correspond to the rate which would be charged or
27. 7 COWER ON BANKRUPTCY 81129.06(1XcXii) (Rev. 15th ed. 1996); see also In
re Computer Optics, Inc., 126 B.R. 664, 671 (Bankr. N.H. 1991) ("[M]uch of the
confusion in my judgment stems from additional reference in Collier to a 'coerced
loan', in this context which has skewed analysis ever since.•); C. Frank Carbiener,
Present Value in Bankruptcy: The Search for An Appropriate Cramdown Discount
Rate, 32 S.D. L. REv. 42, 51 (1987) ("The origin of this theory is not found in the
case law but in the treatise, Collier on Bankruptcy.->.
28. It is inaccurate and misleading to refer to Collier as if Collier is a person
and the Collier bankruptcy treatise reflected the views of that person. In 1898, Collier was a person, William Miller Collier, a thirty-year old bankruptcy referee in
Auburn, New York who wrote a treatise setting out his views on the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. See generally Honorable Prudence Beatty Abram & Andrew DeNatale,
From Referee to Bankruptcy Judge: A Century of Change in the Second Circuit, in
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY AND REoRGANIZATION LAW IN THE CoUR'l'S OF
THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES 59, 67 (1995). Today, the Collier treatise has multiple editors and authors who work largely independent of each other.
Accordingly, it is neither surprising nor significant that the author of the portion of
Collier dealing with cram down interest in Chapter 13 was critical of the coerced
loan approach while the author of the portion of Collier dealing with cram down
interest rate in Chapter 11 was advocating the coerced loan approach and neither
even acknowledged the position of the other. 5 COWER, supra note 27, at 81129.03.
Cf. In re Ivey, 147 B.R. 109, 115 (Bankr. MD. N.C. 1992) (stating that Collier criticizes the coerced loan approach but has also caused much confusion surrounding the
interest rate issue by reference to the coerced load theory). But cf. Quila, supra note
23, at 551 n.12 ("Without explanation, Collier advances a 'coerced loan' theory under
Chapter 11 and a 'cost of funds' approach under Chapter 13. Both theories obviously
cannot be correct. Therefore, courts that have relied on Collier regarding the coerced
loan theory [but not courts that have relied on Collier regarding the cost of funds
theory?] should be cited cautiously.-> (citations omitted).
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obtained by the creditor making a loan to a third party with similar terms, duration, collateral and risk. It is therefore submitted
that the appropriate discount rate must be determined by reference to the "market" interest rate.29

No cases were cited to support this statement. In 1980, no reported cases had considered this approach to fixing the cram
down interest rate.

2. Memphis Bank (Sixth Circuit).-In 1982, Memphis Bank
& Trust Co. v. Whitman30 was the initial circuit court opinion
on the secured creditor cram down interest rate. Two months
after obtaining a car loan at 21% interest, Ms. Whitman filed a
Chapter 13 plan which provided that Ms. Whitman would retain
the car and make monthly payments on Memphis Bank's secured claim at ten percent interest. Over the objection of the
secured creditor, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the plan. The
district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court's brief, two-paragraph discussion of the interest
rate to be allowed on a secured claim in a cram down does not
refer to legislative history, the Collier discussion of section 1129,
or any other secondary authority.
Rather than tying the interest rate to an arbitrary ten per cent
rate, the Bankruptcy Court's solution, or some other arbitrary
rate, we hold that in the absence of special circumstances bankruptcy courts should use the current market rate of interest used
for similar loans in the region. Bankruptcy courts are generally
familiar with the current conventional rates on various types of
consumer loans. And where parties dispute the question, proof
can easily be adduced.
The reason we do not use an arbitrary rate is that such a
rate may vary widely from the current market rate. The theory of
the statute is that the creditor is making a new loan to the debtor
in the amount of the current value of the collateral. Under this
29. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPl'CY, 1129.03(4Xf)(i) (15th ed. 1980). The authors of
the current edition of Collier discuss, but do not advocate, the coerced loan approach. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPl'CY , 1129.06(1Xc) (Rev. 15th ed. 1996). See also
Walter J. Blum, Treatment of Interest on Debtor Obligations in Reorganizations Untkr the Banleruptcy Cotk, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 430, 439 (1983) ("AB an aid to analysis, one can think of impaired creditor classes in a reorganization as making new
forced loans to the debtor entity.•).
30. 692 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982).
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theory, the most appropriate interest rate is the current market
rate for similar loans at the time the new loan is made, not some
other unrelated arbitrary rate.81

·3. Southern States (Eleventh Circuit).-The next year, the
Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion with a similar interpretation
of "value, as of the effective date," in In re Southern States Motor Inns. 32 The bankruptcy court and the district courts
confirmed a Chapter 11 plan which calculated the interest rate
to be paid on unsecured priority federal taxes under section
1129(aX9XC)33 at the statutory rate of interest for unpaid federal taxes less a one per cent reduction for "rehabilitation aspects"
of Chapter 11. Reversing and remanding, the Eleventh Circuit
stated:
We believe that Congress intended that creditors required to accept deferred payments pursuant to section 1129(aX9XC) should
be placed in as good a position as they would have been had the
present value of their claims been paid immediately. Consequently we hold that the interest rate to be used in computing present
value of a claim pursuant to section 1129(aX9XC) should be the
current market rate without any reduction for the "rehabilitation
aspects" of the plan.34

While Southern States involved the same statutory phrase
as Memphis Bank, the issues were different. The objecting creditor in Southern States held a priority, unsecured tax claim
against a Chapter 11 debtor, not a secured claim against a
Chapter 13 debtor.
As a matter of bankruptcy policy, it would be hard to argue
that the holder of an unsecured claim, even an unsecured priority claim, should receive a more favorable interest rate than the
31. Memphis Bank, 692 F.2d at 431.
32. 709 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(aX9XC> states:
Except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed to a
different treatment of such claim, the plan provides that • • •
(C) with respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(aX8) [tax
priority claims] of this title, the holder of such claim will receive on account of
such claim deferred cash payments, over a period not exceeding six years aft.er
the date of assessment of such claim, of a value, as of the effective elate of the
plan, equal t.o the allowed amount of such claim.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(aX9XC) (1978) (emphasis added).
34. In re Southern States Motor Inns, 709 F.2d at 652.
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holder of a secured claim. And, as a matter of bankruptcy law, it
would be hard to argue that the phrase "value, as of the effective
date of the plan" should have a different meaning in section
1129(aX9XC) from its meaning in section 1129(bX2XAXi)(Il) or
in section 1325(aX5XBXii).85 The Southern States opinion recognizes this commonality and relies on Collier's "coerced loan"
analysis of section 1129(bX2XAXiXII) to support its holding.36

B. Circuit Court Decisions Prior to 1997 Approving a
Formula Approach31
1. Doud (Eighth Circuit).-The Eighth Circuit was the first
of the circuits to approve a bankruptcy court's use of a formula
approach to determining the cram down interest rate in United
States v. Doud.38 The Douds' Chapter 12 plan provided for installment payments on the Farmers Home Administration's
(FmHA) secured claim, with an interest rate based on the

35. But cf. Confederation Life Ins. v. Beau Rivage Ltd., 126 B.R. 632 (N.D. Ga.
1991). Confederation Life affirmed confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan that provided a
cram down interest rate to a secured claim measured by the contract rate, rather
than the higher market rate. ~ so holding, the district court distinguished Southern
States: -rhe Eleventh Circuit in Southern States addressed section 1129(aX9XC)
pertaining to delinquent federal tax claims rather than the type of secured creditor
situation presented here.• Confederation Life, 126 B.R. at 638.
36. Southern States, 709 F.2d at 652 n. 7. The Eighth Circuit also recognized the
commonality in relying on both Southern States and the Collier coerced loan analysis
of section 1129(bX2XAXi)(Il) in its initial opinion on secured creditor cram down
interest. In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (8th Cir. 1985). The case involved the cram down of a creditor who had made a secured loan with a 13% interest rate to the debtor prior to its bankruptcy filing. The debtor's Chapt.er 11 plan in
effect reduced that interest rate to 10.5%, a rate based on United States treasury
bill yields. Over the secured creditor's objection, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the
Chapter 11 plan. The district court reversed and ordered that the interest rate under the plan be the contract rate of 13%. The Eighth Circuit in its Monnier Bros.
opinion affirmed the district court decision and stated: "Lacking any evidence correlating other rates with the 'coerced loan' approach contemplated by the plan, the
district court did not err in reinstating the contract rate.• Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d
at 1339. The Eighth Circuit also later affirmed that "value, as of the effective date
of the plan,• has the same meaning throughout the Bankruptcy Code. See United
States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1285 (8th Cir. 1986) (relying on
Monnier Brw. in a section 1129(aX9XC) case).
37. In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997), also approved the formula
approach. It is considered separately, infra at text accompanying notes 82-94.
38. 869 F.2d 1144 (8th Cir. 1989).
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treasury bill rate plus a one percent risk factor. The FmHA
objected, and the bankruptcy court held that the cram down
interest rate in the plan should be based on the "yield on a treasury bond with a remaining maturity matched to the average
amount outstanding during the term of the allowed claim plus a
two percent adjustment for risk."89 The debtors appealed, and
both the district court and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
In approving the formula approach to cram down interest
rate, Doud discusses several bankruptcy court decisions that
take this approach but relies primarily on an earlier Eighth
Circuit decision, In re Monnier Brothers.'° In that case, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's confirmation of a
Chapter 11 plan that provided for cram down interest at the
pre-bankruptcy contract rate. The Monnier Brothers opinion,
however, uses the language and the reasoning of the formula
approach: the court found that the contract rate is the appropriate base rate and that there were no new risks to merit an additional risk premium.41
The Doud opinion does not refer to the Memphis Bank or
Southern States decisions. It does not reject or even discuss the
coerced loan approach.
2. Fowler (Ninth Circuit).-The Ninth Circuit has also
approved a bankruptcy court's formula approach to determination of the cram down interest rate in a Chapter 12 case, in In
re Fowkr.42 While Fowkr mentions the Memphis Bank decision
and acknowledges two methods of determining a market cram
down rate,43 the opinion does not give reasons for its approval
of the formula approach and does not preclude a bankruptcy
court's use of the coerced loan approach in other cases. Fowkr's
holding is simply that in this case the bankruptcy court "did not

39. In re Dowd, 4 B.R. 865, 870 (Banla. S.D. Iowa 1987), affd, 869 F.2d 1144
(8th Cir. 1989).
40. 755 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985).
41. Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d at 1339.
42. 903 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1990). The court in Fowler reads an earlier Ninth
Circuit case on section 1129(aX9XC) interest on deferred payment of priority tax
claims, United States v. Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 818
F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987), as approving the use of the formula approach. Fowler,
903 F.2d at 696.
43. Id.
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err in using this [the formula] approach to determine the
cramdown interest rate.""

C. Circuit Court Decisions Comparing Approaches
1. Hardzog (Tenth Circuit).-The Tenth Circuit decision, In
re Hardzog,.u. was the first opinion by a circuit court that discusses both the coerced loan and formula methods of determining the cram down interest rate. The Chapter 12 debtor in
Hardzog had a farm mortgage that provided for interest at a
rate of 12.5%. The original Chapter 12 plan provided for deferred payments of the secured claim with an interest rate of
7.5%.
Over the objection of the secured creditor, the Bankruptcy
Court confirmed a modified plan which called for an interest
rate of 10%. In establishing the cram down interest rate at 10%,
the Bankruptcy Court determined the secured creditor's cost of
funds at 9.3% and added .7% as a risk factor. 48 The district
court affirmed.47
In reversing and remanding, the Tenth Circuit expressly
rejected the "cost of funds" approach in United States v. Doud
and expressly mandated that bankruptcy courts use the "current
market rate of interest used for similar loans in the region" in
fixing the secured creditor cram down interest rate.48 Hardzog
gave a number of reasons for so ruling: (1) "A 'cost of funds'
approach is not susceptible of accurate determination without
complex problems of proof and may not result in fairness;"" 9 (2)
"Bankruptcy Courts, counsel, lenders and borrowers should have
a familiarity with current interest rates on like-type loans and
when a dispute arises, the market rate should be easily susceptible of determination . . . ";60 and (3) "Chapter 12 is predicated

«. Id. at 698.
45. 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990).
46. There is a list of ten items that the Bankruptcy Court considered in fixing
the risk factor of .7%. Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank, 113 B.R. 718, 722 (W.D.
Okla. 1989). Finding a "plug" number that would result in an interest rate midway
between the 7.5% prepared by the debtor, and the 12.5% demanded by the secured
creditor, was not on the list.
47. Hardzog, 113 B.R. at 718.
48. Hardzog, 901 F.2d at 860.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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upon the theory that the lender is making a new loan to the
debtor. It therefore follows that the most appropriate rate is the
current market rate for similar loans ...."61

2. United Carolina (Fourth Circuit).-In United Carolina
Bank v. Hall, 62 the Fourth Circuit expressly adopted the coerced loan approach taken by the Tenth Circuit in Hardzog and
by the Sixth Circuit in Memphis, expressly rejected the approach
taken by the Eighth Circuit in Doud and the Ninth Circuit in
Fowler, and evaluated the two approaches. United Carolina,
however, "reads" Doud and Fowler as basing cram down interest
on what the secured creditor has to pay to borrow funds on the
assumption that the secured creditor will borrow new funds to
replace the money tied up in the bankruptcy by the plan.68 According to United Carolina:
A major difficulty with this approach, often referred to as the
cost of funds approach, however, is its underlying assumption
that the secured creditor has an unlimited supply of credit. When
it is recognized that every secured creditor has a limited amount
of credit on which to draw, then it follows that utilizing some of
that borrowing capacity without providing the secured creditor
with the usual return on its capital produces a loss for the secured creditor.54

There are other difficulties with the cost of funds approach.
A cram down interest rate measured by the costs of funds ignores the risks that the debtor will not make the payments
proposed in the plan.66 In measuring the cram down interest

51.
52.
53.
tion of

Id.

993 F.2d 1126 (4th Cir. 1993).
United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1130. I disagree with this charact.eriza·
DorJd and Fowler. The formula approved in these cases can better be described as approximating the debtor's cost of funds than the secured creditor's cost of
funds. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 68 n.9 (3d Cir.
1993).
54. United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1130.
55. In theory, if a lender had a substantial portion of its assets invested in a
secured loan to the debtor, then its costs of credit would reflect the debtor's
creditworthiness and the risks of nonpayment by the debtor. See Michael E.S.
Frankel, The Emerging Fixed Cramdown Rate Regime: A Market-Driven Argument for
Effective Fixed Rates in Bankruptcy Cramdown, 2 U. Cm. L. SCH. RoUNDTABLE 643,
647 (1995).
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rate on the costs of funds to the creditor, the focus is on the
creditworthiness of the creditor, not the creditworthiness of the
debtor. The cost of funds to United Carolina Bank turns on
factors such as its capital, the efficiency of its operation, and its
credit history. United Carolina Bank's cost of funds does not
reflect Loretta A Degolier Hall's capital, her efficiency, or her
credit history.
Moreover, by focusing on the creditworthiness of the creditor, a cram down interest rate based on the cost of funds approach in essence rewards a lender for being inefficient or poorly
capitalized. More efficient and better capitalized lenders will
have lower costs of funds. Under the cost of funds approach, if
Ms. Hall not only financed her mobile home purchase with United Carolina Bank but also financed her car purchase with
Friendly Finance Company and proposed to cram down both
United Carolina's and Friendly Finance's secured claim in her
Chapter 13 plan, the cost of funds approach might result in
Friendly Finance receiving a higher cram down interest rate on
its secured claim than United Carolina for reasons unrelated to
the rates of interest in their prebankruptcy contracts and unrelated to the risks presented by their postbankruptcy cram
downs.
3. Jones (Third Circuit).-General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Jones 66 is the most-cited circuit court decision on cram down
interest rates. Mr. Jones purchased a truck pursuant to a financing agreement with GMAC providing for 11.98% interest.
His Chapter 13 plan proposed that Mr. Jones would retain the
truck and make periodic payments to GMAC on its secured
claim at 10% interest. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan,
over GMAC's objection, using a cost of funds approach to cram
down interest rates, with the prime rate as the presumptive cost
of funds. 117 The district court affirmed without opinion. The
Third Circuit reversed and remanded, adopting a coerced loan
approach to cram down interest rates, with the contract rate as
the presumptive coerced loan rate.118

56. 999 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1993).
57. See In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 190-192 (Bankr. N.J. 1991).
58. Jona, 999 F.2d at 67-68.
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In so ruling, the Third Circuit compares the formula approach, the cost of funds approach, and the coerced loan approach. According to Jones, the "coerced loan [approach] presents a more complete picture of what happens in a cramdown"159
because:
(i) present value requires that the secured creditor be put in
an economic position equivalent to receiving the amount of its
secured claim immediately;
(ii) present value should thus include the additional
amounts that the secured creditor could generate in its business
if the plan provided for immediate rather than deferred payment
of its secured claim;
(iii) if the secured creditor received immediate payment and
made a new loan, it would anticipate that over the course of the
loan it would recover not only its costs of capital but also its
costs of servicing the loan and a profit.60
In so ruling, the Third Circuit acknowledges that a coerced
loan in a bankruptcy cram down is not the "precise equivalent"
of a new loan outside of bankruptcy.61 Arguably, the coerced
loan is less costly because of the absence of any loan marketing
costs and lower loan monitoring costs.62 And arguably, the coerced loan is more costly because cram down coerced loans, unlike the typical new loan, are loans without an "equity cushion"
and because a Chapter 11, 12, or 13 debtor has a more problematic credit history that the borrower in a new loan.63 Jones concludes that "the elements that would tend to make 'coerced
loans' more costly to the secured creditor than new loans, and
the elements that would tend to make 'coerced loans' less costly
to the secured creditor than new loans will generally balance
out ...."64
The Jones opinion also acknowledges the bankruptcy court's
objection to profit as a component of the cram down interest
rate: "[P]rofit is not an appropriate factor to consider in determining present value in a Chapter 13 case."65 The Third
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 67.
Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Jones, 999 F.2d at 68.
Id. at 69.
In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 145, 189 (Bankr. N.J. 1991); see also In re Valenti,
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Circuit's Jones opinion does not contain the bankruptcy court's
one-sentence "explanation" for its "no profit" statement: "The
Bankruptcy Code protects the creditor's interest in the property,
not the creditor's interest in the profit it had hoped to make on
the loan."66
While this sentence might be relevant and helpful to an
understanding of some provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, such
as section 362(d), which deal with "adequate protection" of interest in property, it is neither relevant nor helpful to an understanding of the Bankruptcy Code's cram down provisions which
deal with present value of payments under a plan. In a cram
down, the secured creditor is seeking payment, not "protection."
And in a cram down, the secured creditor is not asking for payment of the "profit it had hoped to make on the [pre-bankruptcy]
loan." Rather, the secured creditor is asking for payment of the
profits that it would have made from its postbankruptcy use of
the amount of its secured claim if the debtor had paid its secured claim in cash instead of using the Bankruptcy Code's cram
down power to defer payment of the secured claim.67
AB the Third Circuit explains in Jones, recognition of profit
is consistent with the objective of section 1325(aX5XBXii) of
putting "the creditor in the same position it would have been in
if it had been allowed to end the lending relationship at the
point of the bankruptcy filing by repossessing the collateral ...."68 The creditor would have reinvested the proceeds in a

105 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 1997) ("There is no reason, therefore, that the interest rate
should account for profit."); In re Hudock, 124 B.R. 532, 534 (Banlcr. N.D. Ill. 1991)
("{T]he Bankruptcy Code protects the creditor's interest in the property, not the
creditor's interest in the profit it had hoped to make on the loan.•); LUNDIN, aupra
note 4, at 5-149; C. Frank Carbiener, Present Value in Bankruptcy: The Search for
An Appropriate Cramdown Discount Rate, 32 S.D. L. REv. 42, 60 (1986) CiAlllowing
creditors to collect profit clearly violates the Code objective of treating all creditors
fairly, and it should not be allowed."); Todd J. Zywicki, Cramdown and the Code.
Calculating Cramdown Intereat Ratea Under The Bankruptcy Code, T. MARsHALL L.
REv. 241, 255-56 (1994) ("'Profit' from the loan is also impermissible."). But aee In re
Arnold, 80 B.R. 806, 810 (Banlcr. M.D. La. 1987) ("While the author [Carbiener] of
the law review article may have some personal objection to a lender making a profit, I am under a duty to interpret a statute rather than to indulge my preference,
and I find no authority for such a proposition in the Bankruptcy Code. • • • ").
66. Jordan, 130 B.R. at 189.
67. Id.
68. Jonea, 999 F.2d at 69.
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new loan with a profit component.

4. Koopmans (Seventh Circuit).-Koopmans v. Farm Credit
Services of Mid-America, ACA69 has been described as an opinion that "adopted a 'cost funds' approach"7° and has also been
described as one of "[t]he leading cases articulating the 'coerced
loan' view. . . . "7t It can better be described as a case that approves a bankruptcy court's use of the formula approach but
that does not require bankruptcy courts to use any particular
approach to determine the market rate. 72
The Koopmans filed a Chapter 12 plan that proposed to
retain their family farm worth more than $200,000 and make
periodic payments to Farm Credit Services which held a
$110,000 first mortgage on the farm. Farm Credit Services objected to the plan's interest rate on the periodic payments of
6.9%, based on the treasury bill rate. In an unreported opinion,
the bankruptcy court held that the appropriate cram down interest rate was 10.5%, based on the prime rate of interest of 9%
which the court found was the prevailing market rate for wellsecured farm loans, plus a 1.5% additional risk factor because of
the Koopmans' credit history.
The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the
bankruptcy court's decision could be classified as a "formula
approach" decision, both the district court78 and the Seventh
Circuit7" use the phrase "coerced loan" to describe the bankruptcy court's methodology. More important than commentators'
classification of the Seventh Circuit's Koopmans decision or the
Seventh Circuit's classification of the bankruptcy court's
Koopmans decision are (i) the Seventh Circuit's discussion of
profit, (ii) the Seventh Circuit's view of the critical cram down
interest rate question, and (iii) its answer to that question.
Koopmans addresses the objection to a cram down interest

69.
70.
Second
71.
72.
Means,
73.
74.

102 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 1996).
Timothy D. Moratzka, Chapter 13 Interest Rate Pegged to Trea8UI)' Rate in
Circuit, 14 AM. BANKR. lNsT. J. 16 (Apr. 1997).
Qulia, supra note 23, at 551 n.11.
Cf. Robert M. Fishman & Brian L. Shaw, Koopmans: The End Justifies the
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Apr. 1997, at 15-17.
Koopmans v. Farm Credit Serv., 196 B.R. 425, 428 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
Koopmans, 102 F.3d at 875.
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rate that includes profit by analogizing a secured creditor subjected to a Chapter 12 cram down to other suppliers.715 The Seventh Circuit notes that a seed supplier or other supplier to a
Chapter 12 debtor post-petition can receive its market price,
including profit; there is no bankruptcy rule prohibiting suppliers to Chapter 12 debtors from receiving a profit.76 Similarly, a
secured creditor subjected to a cram down, who in essence is an
involuntary supplier of capital to a Chapter 12 debtor, can receive its market rate, including a profit.77
According to Koopmans, the question that a court must
answer in determining the cram down interest rate is: "At what
rate of interest, will Farm Credit Services be as well off in the
reorganization as if it had been allowed to foreclose on and sell
the farm?" 78 Under the Koopmans facts, a $110,000 claim secured by property worth more than $200,000, Farm Credit Services would have received the full amount of its secured claim of
$110,000 if it had been allowed to foreclose. Thus, the Koopmans
question asks what rate of interest will result in the secured
creditor being as well off as if it had received the immediate, full
cash payment of its secured claim.79 The Seventh Circuit then

75. Id. at 876.
76. Id.
77. Id. Judge Easterbrook also provides an economic analysis of the profit issue:
"[l]n competition, a financial intermediary does not make a 'profit.' True, there may
be accounting profits, but there are no economic profits in vigorous competition, one
of Adam Smith's principal points in The Wealth of Nations (1776). See generally
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEoRY OF PRICE 178-92 (4th ed. 1987). Normal returns to
entrepreneurial and managerial skills may keep the wolf from the door, but they are
not economic 'profit.,. Id.
78. Koopmans, 102 F.3d at 874.
79. The wording of this question (and the wording of the Seventh Circuit's answer to its question) becomes problematic in the more typical cases in which the
creditor is undersecured. For example, consider again the facts of Rash, discussed in
the text, infra at at 459-60. There, a truck with a foreclosure value of less than
$32,000 secured a debt of more than $41,000. Because the debtor's Chapter 11 plan
proposed to retain the truck, the Court found that Associates' secured claim is measured by the truck's replacement value of $41,000 and not its foreclosure value of
$32,000. Reading and applying the words of the Koopmans question c•as if it had
been allowed to foreclose on and sell") would mean that the cram down interest rate
in the Rashes' Chapter 13 plan would have to produce the same amount that Associates would have realized had it received the $32,000 foreclosure value in cash at
the time of plan confirmation. Reading and applying the words of section
1325(aX5XBXii) and the Rash decision literally would mean that the cram down
interest rate in the Rashes' Chapter 13 plan would produce the same amount that
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answers this question in general terms: "[T]he creditor [in a
cram down] is entitled to the rate of interest it could have obtained had it foreclosed and reinvested the proceeds in loans of
equivalent duration and risk."80 The Seventh Circuit prefaces
this answer by expressly noting that it is not even "implying
[that the method used by the bankruptcy court] is the only way
to approximate the market rate of interest ....nei

5. Valenti (Second Circuit).-General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Valenti82 is the last circuit court decision to consider
the various approaches for determining the cram down interest
rate prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rash. Valenti is
also the only circuit court decision on cram down interest rate
that directly and expressly rejects the coerced loan approach as
a possible measure of the cram down interest rate.83
The Valentis had purchased a car in 1993 and financed the
purchase with General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC)
on an installment sales contract with an interest rate of 12.95%.
In 1994, they filed a Chapter 13 petition and a plan proposing to

Associates would have realized bad it received its $41,000 secured claim in cash at
the time of the plan confirmation. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit's question should
be reframed: "At what rate of interest will a secured creditor be as well off as if it
had been paid the full amount of its secured claim in cash?"
80. Koopmans, 102 F.3d at 875.
81. Id.
82. 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997); see generally Qulia, supra note 28, at 549 (as·
serting that while many courts have adopted the ambiguous statutory language of
the coerced law theory to reach perceived "fair" results that are unsupported by the
Bankruptcy Code, the Valenti decision was faithful to the Code and was economical
for debtors, creditors and the judiciary); John J. Rapisardi, Cramdown Interest Rates:
Should Lenders Profits Be Included? N.Y. L.J., June 5, 1997 at 1 (comparing the
Valenti decision to the Koopmans decision).
83. The Eighth Circuit in Doud and the Ninth Circuit in Fowler approve a
bankruptcy court's use of a formula approach. Supra notes 38-44 and accompanying
text. Neither requires a bankruptcy court to use the formula approach in all cases.
Neither expreBBly precludes bankruptcy courts from using the coerced loan approach.
Three other reported cases from the Eighth Circuit look to comparable loans in fix.
ing "present value." See United States v. Roso, 76 F.3d 179 (8th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1986); United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Fisher, 930 F.2d 1361, 1363 (8th Cir. 1991). There is an arguably somewhat similar division in Ninth Circuit cases. See In re Camino Real Landscape
Maintenance Contractors, 818 F.2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir. 1987) (Chapter 11 case
under section 1129(aX9XC) (deferral of federal truces), requiring the bankruptcy court
to look to the rate on similar loans in the open market).
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retain the car and make installment payments to GMAC at 8%
interest. GMAC objected; the bankruptcy court fixed the cram
down interest rate at 9% and confirmed the plan without issuing
an opinion. In affirming, the district court concluded that section
1325 contemplates "market rate interest," and "the relevant
market rate ... is the rate paid by GMAC for the funds it borrows."84
The Second Circuit vacated the district court's holding on
interest and remanded for a recalculation based on (i) the rate of
United States treasury instrument with a maturity similar to
the plan repayment schedule and (ii) a risk premium.85 Valenti
described the district court's "cost of funds," approach as the
approach that "more appropriately reflects the present value of a
creditor's allowed claim" but rejected the costs of funds approach
because of problems in its application.86 Because each lender
has a different costs of funds, Chapter 13 debtors would pay
different interest rates for reasons unrelated to the debtors'
creditworthiness and each proceeding would require an evidentiary hearing on the creditor's costs of funds.87
Valenti also expressly rejected the coerced loan approach:
We believe that courts adopting the "forced loan" approach misapprehend the "present value" function of the interest rate. The
objective of section 1325(aX5)(BXii) is to put the creditor in the
same economic position that it would have been in had it received
the value of its allowed [sic] claim immediately. The purpose is
not to put the creditor in the same position that it would have
been in had it arranged a "new" loan.88

The second and third sentences from the above excerpt seem
inconsistent. In Valenti, if GMAC had "received the value of its
allowed claim"89 immediately, it would have used the funds it
84. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti, 191 B.R. 521, 522 (N.D.N.Y.
1995), a{fd, 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997).
85. Valenti, 105 F.3d at 64.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 63.
88. Id. at 63-64.
89. The Second Circuit's use of the phrase •allowed claim• in Valenti is somewhat imprecise. Section 1325(aX5XBXii) refers to •such claim•, i.e., the secured claim.
A creditor's secured claim can be different from its •allowed claim.• Often a creditor
has both an allowed secured claim and an allowed unsecured claim. Section 506(a)
limits a secured claim to the value of the collateral which secures it and the balance
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received to arrange a new loan to some third party. GMAC's
return from that new loan would reflect not only GMAC's costs
of funds but also its other costs and risks and a profit.
Bankruptcy courts in the Second Circuit cannot follow the
mandate of the second sentence from Valenti without violating
the mandate of the third sentence from Valenti. Bankruptcy
courts cannot put a creditor like GMAC "in the same economic
position that it would have been in had it received the value of
its allowed [sic] claim immediately" without putting it "in the
same position that it would have been in had it arranged a 'new'
loan."90
The above excerpt from the Valenti opinion is not only internally inconsistent but is also inconsistent with the opinion of the
Seventh Circuit in Koopmans. A comparison of Valenti with
Koopmans illustrates the diversity in the rhetoric, if not reasoning, of the circuit courts' opinions on cram down interest rates
prior to the Supreme Court's Rash decision.
Valenti condemns any "profit" component in a cram down
interest rate. 91 Koopmans alternatively approves a profit component and questions whether there can even be an economic
profit in any interest rate.9'l Valenti mandates bankruptcy
courts' use of the "formula approach" in determining the appropriate cram down interest rate.98 Koopmans expressly refrains
from even implying which bankruptcy approach courts should
use in determining the appropriate cram down interest rate in
other cases.94 And yet arguably, the Second Circuit, like the
Seventh Circuit, would have approved the bankruptcy court's
use of the prime plus 1.5% formula under the facts of Koopmans,

of the debt is an unsecured claim. See generally David Gray Carlson, Bi/Urcation of
Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1996) (describing
consequences of Section 596 bifurcation). In Valenti, the bankruptcy court valued
GMAC's collateral at $6,700, the average of its wholesale and retail prices so that
GMAC had an allowed secured claim of $6,700 and an allowed unsecured claim for
the balance owed by the Valentia. Section 1325(aX5XBXii) and the Valenti opinion
address only the present value of the debtors' proposed deferred payments of the
$6,700 secured claim.
90. Valenti, 105 F.Sd at
91. Id. at 64.
92. Koopmana, 102 F.3d
93. Valenti, 105 F.Sd at
94. Koopmans, 102 F.Sd

63-64.

at 876.
64.

at 875.
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and the Seventh Circuit, like the Second Circuit, would have
reversed and remanded the lower courts' cost of funds approach
to cram down interest rates in Valenti.
IV. SUPREME COURT RAsH DECISION
ON CRAM DOWN OF SECURED CREDITORS

On July 6, 19·97, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
how to measure the value of collateral in the context of a Chapter 13 cram down plan in Associates Commercial Corp. v.
Rash.95 The petition for certiorari in Rash presented the question:
Whether, when a debtor proposes to retain a secured creditor's
collateral under the cramdown powers of Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, the amount required to be paid on account of the
creditor's secured claim is limited to the value that the secured
creditor could have obtained if it had sold the collateral at
foreclosure. 96

In Rash, the Chapter 13 debtors wanted to retain their
tractor truck. Associates held a lien on the truck. The Rashes
filed a Chapter 13 plan that proposed deferred payments to
Associates at 9% interest based on the net foreclosure value of
the truck, $31,875. Associates objected and argued that its secured claim should be based on the replacement value of the
truck, $41,000.
The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the Rashes and fixed the
amount of Associates' secured claim at $31,875, the net amount
Associates would realize on foreclosure. 97 The district court affirmed in an unreported decision. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,98 holding "the replacement
cost approach is the only one that gives full effect to the language of section 506(a)."99 Initially, the Fifth Circuit in a 2-1

95. 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).

96. Brief of Petitioner at i, Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash. 117 S. Ct.
1879 (1997) (No. 96-454).
97. In re Rash, 149 B.R. 430 (Banlcr. E.D. Tex. 1993).
98. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash}, 31 F.3d 325 (5th Cir.
1994).
99. Rash, 31 F.3d at 329.
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decision denied a petition for panel rehearing. 100 Then, the
court granted such a petition,101 and on rehearing en bane, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court and the district
court, holding that Associates' secured claim was limited to the
$31,875 net foreclosure value. 102 The Supreme Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit panel and held that the replacement value
standard and not the foreclosure value standard governs in cram
down cases.103 The Court based its holding on the language of
section 506.1°'
In the Rash case, Associates did not object to the proposed
9% cram down interest rate. The question of the proper method
for determining "value, as of the effective date of the plan" was
not raised by Associates nor considered by the Court. The Rash
decision addresses solely the question of valuation of collateral
under section 506, not the question of valuation of deferred
payments under section 1325.
Even though the Court addressed a different question under
a different section of the Bankruptcy Code, attorneys for debtors,
attorneys for secured creditors, and bankruptcy judges, will
creatively use the Rash decision to support their positions on
questions of cram down interest rates. 105 The policy choice
made by the Court in Rash and the Court's choice of particulars
in a footnote in Rash provide two examples of possible arguments.
First, the policy question resolved in Rash is the same as
the policy question raised in litigation over cram down interest
rates: should a debtor in bankruptcy be able to obtain better
than market terms because of bankruptcy? In Rash, the debtors
100. In re Rash, 62 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 1995).
101. In re Rash, 68 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 1995).
102. In re Rash, 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996).
103. Rash, 117 s. Ct. 1879 (1997).
104. Id. at 1884-86.
105. Compare In re Segura, No. 97-03289-R, 1998 WL 97812, *8 (Banla. N.D.
Okla. Mar. 5, 1998) (Judge Rasure finds that Rash supports a coerced load approach
stating: ''This 'replacement lender' theory is consistent with the policy articulated in
Hardzog • • • and is also complimentary to Rash in that the 'new' transaction is
viewed from the debtor's perspective for both valuation and interest rate determinations."), and In re Goodyear, No. 94-10645, 96-10014, 1998 WL 58528, *3 (Banla. Vt.
Feb. 3, 1998) (Judge Conrad finds that Rash supports a formula approach stating:
"Rash shifted compensation for the risk to default from the 'interest' component of
'value' to the valuation component.").
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it would cost them to obtain a similar truck on the open market.
In Valenti and the other cram down interest rate cases, the

debtors were seeking to retain the use of a creditor's funds by
paying less than what it would cost them to obtain similar funds
on the open market. Secured creditors may argue that since
Rash looks to the replacement costs of the truck in determining
the amount of the secured claim, courts should now look to the
replacement costs of new funds in determining "value, as of the
effective date of the plan."
There are at least two flaws in any such argument. First,
the Rash decision is based on statutory interpretation, not policy.106 The Rash opinion focuses on and is largely limited to the
meaning of language in the Bankruptcy Code. Second, the statute interpreted in Rash, section 506, provides that valuation of
the collateral turns on "the proposed disposition or use of such
property," and the Court relied on that language in concluding
that "the replacement-value standard accurately gauges the
debtor's 'use' of the property."107 Section 506 refers to the
debtor's use. Section 506 views the issue of valuation of the
collateral for purposes of determining the amount of the secured
claim from the debtor's perspective. Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) does
not contain comparable language. Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) does
not suggest a debtor perspective.
Language contained and not contained in footnote 6 of the
Rash opinion can be the basis of other arguments on cram down
interest rates. That footnote states in relevant part:
For example, where the proper measure of the replacement value
of a vehicle is its retail value, an adjustment to that value may be
necessary: A creditor should not receive portions of the retail
price, if any, that reflect the value of items the debtor does not
receive when he retains his vehicle, items such as warranties,
inventory, storage and reconditioning. 108

106. Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1884 ("[t]he Bankruptcy Code provision central to the
resolution of this case is § 506(a)"). Id. at 1886 ("Whatever the attractiveness of a
standard that picks the midpoint between foreclosure and replacement values, there
is no warrant for it in the Code."). See also Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, No. 96-454, 1997
WL 82686, at *12 (referring to case law interpreting section 506(a)).
107. Id. at 1885.
108. Id. at 1886-87 n.6 (citations omitted).
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inventory, storage and reconditioning. 108

The debtor or Chapter 13 trustee can argue from footnote 6 that
if the present value of deferred payments under a plan are based
on the coerced loan approach, then the creditor should not receive portions of the interest rate on such a loan that reflect
costs that the creditor does not incur such as marketing costs.
And, the secured creditor can argue from footnote 6 that exclusion of "profits" from the list of excluded items means that present value can include profit.
While the Rash opinion will be a source to lawyers for arguments in proceedings challenging the cram down interest rate in
Chapter 11, 12, and 13 cases, it does not provide a basis for
judges to determine the appropriate cram down interest rate. At
most, Rash will affect the explanations judges offer for their
cram down interest rate determinations. Because of the Supreme Court's emphasis on construction of statutory language
and disregard of considerations of efficient case
administration,109 it would seem that future opinions will not
explain their holdings on cram down interest rates in terms such
as "because it is easy to apply, it is objective, and it will lead to
uniform results."110

V.

CALCULATING111 CRAM DOWN INTEREST

RATE AFTER RAsH

A The Fifth Circuit's Approach(es?)
Since the Rash decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has issued two opinions on the cram down
interest rate, Financial Security Assurance, Inc. v. T-H New
108. Id. at 1886-87 n.6 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 1886.
110. This is the language of the Valenti decision. 105 F.3d at 64. See also the
"real bad loser" language in the introductory note. The language of the Fifth Circuit
in In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1997) (•greater need to reduce litigation expenses associated with an individualized discount rate determination•)
suggests that I am also a real bad predictor of what judges will do.
111. Cf. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 675 (1951) ("rash, daring, daredevil,
reckless, temerarious, fool-hardy, adventurous, venturous, venturesome. Ana.
Precipitate, abrupt, impetuous, sudden, hasty, desperate, forlorn. Ant. Calculating.")
(emphasis added).
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Orleans Limited Parlnership,112 a Chapter 11 case, and In re
Smithwick,113 a Chapter 13 case. Both cases cited to the Rash
decision; neither case relied on Rash in affirming bankruptcy
court rulings that the rate of interest in the debtor's prepetition
contract with the lender was an appropriate cramdown interest
rate; and each case provides helpful insights for calculating the
cram down interest rate.
In T-H New Orleans, the debtor's Chapter 11 plan proposed
a cram down interest rate of 8.45%, based on a formula approach. The debtor's expert witness came up with the 8.45%
interest rate by adding 210 basis points to the rate for two-year
treasury instruments. While the debtor's hotel financing expert
in T-H New Orleans somehow came up with the number 210, he
could not on cross-examination come up with the name of a
lender to whom he would recommend making such an 8.45%
loan to the debtor. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the court that
"this interest rate would not adequately compensate FSA for not
receiving its money on the Plan's effective date."114
The add-on factors in T-H New Orleans and in most of the
cases discussing the formula approach seem arbitrary. A reviewer of the Chapter 11 formula approach cases concluded:
Not one of the reported decisions, discussing what 'risk factor'
should be added to a base rate, has even analyzed the probability
and magnitude of actual risk. Decisions may generally discuss the
condition of the debtor or the collateral, especially whether there
is an equity cushion, but an objective basis for quantifying the
risk factor is rarely developed. 115

Judge Lundin reached a similar conclusion as to the Chapter 13
cases that use the formula approach: "The add-on factors used
by many courts seem to be arbitrary and certainly do not represent the financial market's true evaluation of the risk involved
in the various kinds of loans that are forced on lenders in Chapter 13 cases."116

112.
113.
114.
115.

116 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 1997).
121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997).
T-H New Orleans, 116 F.3d at 800.
Jack Friedman, What Courltl Do to Secured Creditora in Chapter 11 Cram
Down, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1495, 1521 (1993).
116. 2 LUNDIN, supra note 4, at 5-147.
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Commentators have also been critical of the accuracy and
validity of the coerced loan approach. According to a recent article on cram down interest rates in Chapter 11 cases co-authored
by Judge Pearson, Dillon Jackson and Tim Nohr:
Indeed, in no reported case has a court concluded, based on evidence presented, that any actual market exists in which a lender
makes loans to debtors under the circumstances which generally
prevail in reorganization. "[I]t is difficult to arrive at a current
market rate of interest for a hypothetical new loan when there is
no market for the loan proposed, no equity in the property and
limited opportunity on the part of the debtor to obtain financing
outside of the Bankruptcy Code framework." Bankruptcy courts,
notwithstanding the faith of the circuit courts that bankruptcy
judges are familiar with "market" conditions, have been unable to
observe this "market" directly and therefore have been forced to
rely on expert testimony provided by the parties. In fact, no case
has affirmatively linked the terms of the reorganization plans at
issue with a specific market in which rates are widely and timely
reported and in which the terms of the instruments negotiated or
traded mirror the characteristics of emerging Chapter 11 debtors.
The reason is simple: No similar loans are being made. 117

A bankruptcy cram down of a secured creditor is dissimilar
to loans being made outside of bankruptcy in that a cram down
forces the secured creditor to make a 100% loan to value. If the
amount owed the secured creditor is 100 and the collateral has a
value of 70, then a Chapter 11, 12, or 13 who proposes to retain
the encumbered property and pay the creditor over time is in
essence forcing the secured creditor to make a loan of 70 secured
by collateral worth 70. Outside of bankruptcy, a lender does not
generally make a 100% loan to value.
Because of the absence of a market for 100% loans, an "investment band" technique can be employed to hypothesize the
loans that the debtor could obtain in the market place. The band
of investment technique typically divides the cram down loan
into two or more loans: (1) a senior band or loan in an amount
equal to the loan-to-value ratio for which there is an actual
market for secured loans and (2) one or more junior bands or

117. Pearson et al., supra note 19, at 47 (1996). See also Zywicki, supra note 65,
at 257-58 (criticizing the Locke loan approach as unrealistic).
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loans for the remaining amount of the secured claim. The interest rate required to be paid under the plan as the market rate is
then derived as a blended rate taldng into account the amounts
and interest rates of these hypothetical loans.118
In the T-H New Orleans Chapter 11 case, the secured
creditor's interest rate expert used investment band methodology in arguing for a cram down interest rate of 13.6%.119 In an
unreported decision, the bankruptcy court in T-H New Orleans
found that this rate was too high because of testimony that the
collateral would increase in value over the life of the plan and
testimony that the debtor would be able to make plan payments.
The bankruptcy court also found that the 8.45% formula approach interest rate urged by the debtor was too low and so
determined that the contract rate of 11.5% was the appropriate
rate for this case.
The district court affirmed. 120 The Fifth Circuit also affirmed, holding simply that the "bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in its determination of the appropriate cramdown
interest rate."121
In so holding, the court quoted from its earlier decision in In
re Briscoe Enter. Ltd.,1-a stating that "[o]ften the contract rate
will be an appropriate rate,"128 but neither Briscoe nor T-H
New Orleans should be read as requiring bankruptcy courts to
use the contract rate as the cram down interest rate or to use
any particular approach to determining the cram down interest
rate. While the court in T-H New Orleans affirmed the bankruptcy court's use of the contract rate for cram down interest,
the Fifth Circuit expressly declined to establish a particular
formula for determining the cram down interest rate.™
Less than two months later, the Fifth Circuit took a seem-

118. See. e.g., In re SM 104 Limited, 160 B.R. 202, 233 et seq. (Banltr. M.D. Fla.
1993); In re Cellular Information Sys., Inc., 171 B.R. 926, 943-44 (Banltr. S.D.N.Y.
1994) (applying investment band approach); see also Pawlowic, supra note 19, at
177-78 (describing the determination of a weighted blended rate).
119. T-H New Orleans, 116 F.3d at 800.
120. In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership, 188 B.R. 799, 810 (Banltr. E.D.
La. 1996).
121. T-H New Orleans, 16 F.3d at 801.
122. 994 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1993).
123. T-H New Orleans, 116 F.3d at 801.
124. Id. at 800.
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ingly different approach to cram down interest rates in Chapter
13 cases in In re Smithwick. 125 In Smithwick, Chapter 13 debtors filed a plan that provided for a cram down interest rate of
11%, based on a local rule which required a formula approach to
Chapter 13 cram down interest-two percent plus the Wall
Street Journal prime rate. 128 The secured creditor objected and
argued for the 12.75% rate in its prebankruptcy contract with
the debtors. 127 The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan. The
district court affirmed, noting that "in making 'cramdown' interest rate determinations, a bankruptcy court should be accorded substantial deference"128 and holding that the Appellant
failed to satisfy its burden of showing that the bankruptcy
court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous.129 In reversing
and remanding, the Fifth Circuit stressed the findings of law
from the Third Circuit's Jonestao decision rather than the findings of facts from the bankruptcy court's Smithwick decision. 18t
Smithwick adopts Jones' "coerced loan" approach. 132 It
agrees with Jones' inclusion of profit as part of the cram down
interest rate and quotes from the Seventh Circuit decision in
Koopmans to further support this position. t 33 The Fifth Circuit
further adopts the Jones' rebuttable presumption that the contract rate is the appropriate cram down interest rate in Chapter
13 cases. tu In so ruling, Smithwick refers to the T-H New Orleans Chapter 11 cram down interest rate decision, states that
the Smithwick decision "is consistent with the approach we have
125. 121 F.8d 211 (5th Cir. 1997).
126. Smithwicle, 121 F.8d at 211 n.1.
127. Id. at 212-218.
128. Green Tree Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Smithwick, 202 B.R. 420, 422 (S.D. Tex.
1996) (footnote omitted).
129. Green '.lTee, 202 B.R. at 424.
180. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jonea, 999 F.2d 68, 65 (Sd Cir. 1998),
discussed supra at notes 56-68 and accompanying text. In her Smithwicle opinion,
Judge Jones refers to the case as "General Motors Acceptance Corp." not "Jones."
181. Smithwicle, 121 F.8d at 214.
182. Id.
188. Id.
184. Id. The district court's decision in Smithwicle noted that Congress considered
and rejected an amendment to section 1825(aX5XBXii) that would have required use
of the contract rate. Green '.lTee, 202 B.R. at 428; see alao Key Bank of N.Y. v.
Barko (In re Barko), 211 B.R. 116, 120 n. 7 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997) (noting that Congress specifically considered and rejected an amendment requiring the contract rate
to be paid).
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taken in Chapter 11 cases."1811 Smithwick then uses a quotation
from the Seventh Circuit Koopmans decision,136 rather than a
quotation from T-H New Orleans or some other Fifth Circuit
case to explain the position that the Fifth Circuit has taken in
Chapter 11 cram down interest rate cases.187

B. A Suggested Approach for Courts
The question of cram down interest rate is a question of
statutory application, a question of application of the phrase
"value, as of the effective date of the plan." The need to apply
the phrase "value, as of the effective date of the plan" only arises
because a Chapter 11, 12, or 13 plan proposes to defer payment
of a creditor's secured claim and the secured creditor objects to
the proposed terms of deferred payment. To state the obvious, a
Chapter 11, 12, or 13 plan that provides for full cash payment to
holders of secured claims does not raise any question of cram
down interest: a secured creditor who receives a cash payment
equal to the value of its secured claim on the effective date of
the plan has received the value of such claim.
135. Smithwicle, 121 F.3d at 214. Judge Parker who was a part of the threejudge panel that decided Smithwicle, wrote the opinion in T-H New Orleans.
136. "I.Tlhe creditor is entitled to the rate of interest it could have obtained had
it foreclosed and reinvested the proceeds in loans of equivalent duration and risk."
Koopmans, 102 F.3d at 214.
137. Smithwicle, 121 F.Sd at 214. In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit does not address
the question of whether a local bankruptcy rule can fix the cram down interest rate
for all Chapter 13 cases in that district. Local Rule 3020(d) of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas states: 'The interest or discount
rate on deferred payments made through a confirmed Chapter 13 plan must equal
two percent plus the prime rate set in the Money Rate Section of the Wall Street
Journal on the date the petition initiating the Chapter 13 case was filed." Id. at 213
n.1. It can be argued that such a rule goes beyond "rules governing practice and
procedure" as contemplated by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9029. See
generally Mary Josephine Newborn Wiggins, Globalism, Parochialiam and Procedure:
A Critical Atauament of Local Rulemaldng in BanAruptcy Court, 46 S.C. L. REv.
1245 (1995) (considering the problems presented by the proliferation of local bankruptcy rules in light of F.R.B.P. 9029). But see In re Wilmsmeyer, 171 B.R. 61
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994). Wilmameyer confirmed a Chapter 13 plan with a cram down
rate based on a local rule of 3.5% plus the Wall Street Journal rate. Wilmsmeyer,
171 B.R. at 64. The local rule for the Eastern District of Missouri, unlike the local
rule for the Southern District of Texas, included the introductory phrase, ialbsent
proof to the contrary." Id. at 63 (discussing the efficacy of local rules under F.R.B.
9029).
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Accordingly, in applying the phrase "value, as of the effective date of the plan," bankruptcy courts should endeavor to
leave the secured creditor as well off as if it had been paid the
amount of its secured claim in cash. The cram down interest
rate should reflect what the secured creditor would have earned
had it taken that cash and reinvested it in loans with terms
comparable to the terms proposed by the debtor's plan and with
risks comparable to the risks presented by the debtor's nonpayment.
In most cases, there will be evidence of relatively comparable transactions. In other cases, the plan's extreme terms or the
debtor's extreme credit history will require that the bankruptcy
court derive an interest rate from a combination of some base
rate and an additional risk factor. 138 And, in still other cases,
bankruptcy courts may conclude that the rate in the contract is
the most credible evidence of what the secured creditor would
have earned had it been paid a cash amount equal to the value
of its secured claim and reinvested that cash in a loan comparable to the terms and risks presented by the debtor's plan.139
A bankruptcy court's determination of "value, as of the effective date of the plan" should be difficult to overturn on appeal.
The appellate court's focus should be on the bankruptcy court's
factual decisions regarding the relevant market rate rather than
on the bankruptcy court's methodology in making these factual
determinations. 140 If the cram down interest rate approved by
the bankruptcy court is not a "clearly erroneous" determination

138. Cf. In re St. Cloud, 209 B.R. 801, 808 (Bankr. Mass. 1997) (setting an interest rate based on the current market rate plus a one point premium for risk).
139. Cf. In re Kennedy, 177 B.R. 967, 974 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1995) (noting that
an "appropriate interest rate provides the creditor with the present value over time•
and should be determined based on evidence of the contract rate, prevailing market
rates, creditor's cost of capital and service, creditor's profit, debtor's situation, the
type and condition of collateral, et.c.). As noted in supra note 134, Congress considered and rejected an amendment to section 1325(aX5XB)(ii) that would have required
that interest be paid at the contract rate. See H.R. 1085, 98th Cong., lat Sees.
§ 19(2)(a)(1983) (amending § 1325 to make the interest rate the contract rate). The
fact that Congress fifteen years ago refused to require contract rate interest in all
cram down cases is not an argument against a bankruptcy court today looking to
the contract interest rate in aome cram down cases.
140. Professor Carlson made a similar (but unsuccessful) argument regarding valuation of collateral under section 506. See David Gray Carlson, Car Wars: Valuation
Standards in Chapter 18 Bankruptcy Cases, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 7, 25, 58 (1996).
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of what the secured creditor would have realized on its secured
claim had it been paid the amount of the secured claim in cash
at the time of the court's confirmation of the plan, then the
bankruptcy court's application of section 1129(bX2)(A)(iXII),
1225(aX5XBXii), or section 1325(aXB)(ii) should be affirmed.
While this suggested approach will reduce appeals from
bankruptcy court cram down interest rate proceedings, it will
not eliminate bankruptcy court litigation. The relevant statutory
language, "value, as of the effective date of the plan" invites
such litigation, and invites the exercise of judicial discretion.
There are obvious market efficiency arguments supporting
proposals for a fixed cram down interest rate such as simply the
prime rate. And, there are obvious judicial efficiency arguments
supporting proposals for handling Chapter 13 cram down interest rate proceedings differently from Chapter 11 cram down
interest rate proceedings.
Such arguments and proposals should be addressed to Congress and not the courts. 141 The present Congressional language, "value, as of the effect date of the plan," does not support
a fixed cram down interest rate or support handling Chapter 13
cram down interest rate proceedings different from Chapter 11
cram down interest rate proceedings.
VI. (NOT A RAsH) CONCLUSION

This Article has considered the Chapter 11, 12, or 13 plan
confirmation question of how to value deferred payments to a
holder of a secured claim. Different courts of appeals have debated over different answers to this question. Because of these
differences, it is probable that the United States Supreme Court
will provide a conclusion to this debate over valuing proposed
cram down payments to holders of secured claims.142

141. A divided National Bankruptcy Review Commission has addressed such
arguments and addressed a proposal to Congress. NATIONAL BANKRUPl'CY REvIEw
COMMISSION, aupra note 1, at 258-62.
142. See Qulia, aupra note 23, at 558; Timothy D. Moratzka, Chapter 13 Intereat
Rate Pegged to Trwaury Rate in Second Circuit, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16 (Apr.
1997) (concluding that the difference in rate formulas among the circuits must be resolved by the United States Supreme Court); see generally Robert M. Lawless &
Dylan Lager Murphy, An Empirical Analysia of Bankruptcy Certiorari, 62 Mo. L.
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In the recent Rash decision, the United States Supreme
Court endeavored to provide a conclusion to the differences
among the courts of appeals over valuation of secured claims in
a cram down. The Court focused on section 506(a) and concluded
that words in the second sentence of section 506(a)-"proposed
disposition or use"-"speak to the how question,"148 i.e., the
question of how secured claims in a cram down should be valued. Rash held that a replacement value standard "renders
meaningful the key words 'disposition or use."'144
Neither Rash nor section 506(a) addresses the standard for
determining the present value of deferred plan payments to
holders of secured claims. If the Supreme Court endeavors to
provide a conclusion to the differences among the courts of appeals over valuation of cram down payments, the Court will
focus on section 1129(bX2XA), 1225(aX5XBXii), or section
1325(aX5XBXii). The Court should conclude that there are no
words in any of these provisions that "speak to the how question", i.e., the question of how plan payments to a holder of a
secured claim in a cram down should be valued. There is no
statutorily mandated "right" approach for this factual determination, no statutory basis for a "Rash" review of bankruptcy
court valuation methodology. The Court should hold that any
value standard that reflects what the secured creditor would
have earned had it been paid in cash "renders meaningful" the
key words "value, as of the effective date of the plan."

REv. 101, 134 (1997) ("the Court approaches bankruptcy cases in more or less the
manner as it approaches any federal law issue. Our study shows that circuit splits
and percolation are important for bankruptcy law, as they are for any other federal

law.").
143. Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
144. Id.

